This study analyses the influence of the party reforms of 2012 and the 'counter-reforms' of 2013-14 on the Russian party system, and the structure of political and electoral cleavages in Russian regions. The emergence of new political parties in 2012-13 led to a temporary increase in electoral competition, an augmentation of the political space and a rise in the number of electoral cleavages, but these developments did not weaken the domination of United Russia.
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The party and electoral reforms of 2012 and the counter-reforms of 2013-14 have had a major influence on elections to regional legislatures in Russia. The adoption of new rules governing the registration of parties, and the emergence of scores of new parties, not only intensified the levels of political competition but also changed the structure of the political and electoral cleavages in the regions.
The aim of this paper is to analyse how changes in the number of parties competing in regional elections have affected the cleavage structure at the regional level. Since 2004 Russian regional legislatures have been elected by a mixed electoral system (combining party list PR elections with single mandate races). As party membership has not been an important factor in the single member races (Golosov 2004) , we focus on the party list contests in four rounds of regional assembly elections conducted over the period 2012-15. The first section analyses changes to electoral and party legislation, the second examines the party makeup of regional legislatures and the third provides a detailed account of changes in the cleavage structure.
Changes to Party and Electoral Legislation
In the wake of the mass demonstrations which emerged in protest against the results of the elections to the State Duma in 2011, radical changes to electoral and party registration laws were adopted in spring 2012 which made it much easier for parties to register and participate in elections (see Ross, 2014) . According to these amendments the number of party members required for registration was drastically reduced from 40,000 to 500! 1 As a result of this new legislation, the total number of parties rose sharply from 7 in December 2011 to 78 by September 2015. Here it would appear that there was a move from one extreme (too few parties) to another (too many parties) and that this was a deliberate strategy of the Kremlin to 1 Russian Federation, Federal Law No. 28, 2 April 2012. 3 keep the opposition weak and fragmented. In addition, changes to the rules governing registering for elections stipulated that party list candidates no longer needed to submit nomination signatures, and the maximum number of signatures required by independent candidates was lowered from 2% to 0.5%. 2 In previous elections scores of opposition candidates and party lists were denied registration because the regional electoral commissions declared their nomination signatures invalid (see Ross 2011 and 2011a) . The new election rules now made it much easier for parties to register for elections.
The Counter-Reform of 2013-4
Unfortunately, these reforms did not last long as the mass protest movement lost momentum and gradually fizzled out, and the Putin regime began to feel more secure. In 2013 and 2014 a series of amendments were quickly pushed through the Duma which has led to a re-tightening of the Kremlin's reigns over the election process and the abolition of many of the reforms adopted in 2012. These new laws changed the situation so drastically that scholars of Russian politics refer to them as "party counter-reforms" (Borisov, Korgunyuk, Lyubarev, and Mikhaleva 2015) .
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In May 2014 the requirement of party list candidates to collect nomination signatures was reinstated, although the percentage of signatures required was lowered from 2% to 0.5% of the regional electorate. In sharp contrast, for candidates in the single mandate elections, the number of required signatures was raised from 0.5 to 3%. 4 Whilst these electoral thresholds are 4 not particularly high, the reintroduction of nomination signatures gave the electoral commissions the opportunity to deny opposition parties entry to the elections. Candidates have been denied registration in the past, because they wrote the date or signed their name in the wrong place on their nomination forms, or because they used the wrong colour of pen or because of other trivial mistakes made by the collectors of the signatures (Ross, 2011, 648) . (Kynev, Lyubarev and Maximov 2015, p.182 ) and 20.7% in 2015 (Kynev, Lyubarev and Maximov 2015a, pp. 18-19) However, for those parties which did not need to submit nomination signatures, the corresponding figures were much smaller, just 3.9% and 2.1% respectively, whilst for those parties which had to collect signatures, the numbers denied registration were much higher, comprising 74.2% in 2014 (Kynev, Lyubarev and Maximov 2015, p. 182 ) and 89.4% in 2015 (Kynev, Lyubarev and Maximov 2015a, pp. 18-19) 5 Parties which hold seats in, or win 3% of the votes in regional assemblies, or 0.5% of the total number of seats in a region's municipal councils, are also exempt from submitting signatures in those particular regions, and this allowed a number of other opposition parties (such as, Patriots of Russia and Just Cause), to compete in a few regions without submitting signatures. 
Changes in the levels of party contestation and party saturation of regional legislatures
47 regional legislatures were elected over the period 2012-15: 6 in 2012, 16 in 2013, 14 in 2014, and 11 in 2015. 6 An analysis of these campaigns and their results can help us uncover important trends in the development of the Russian party system. The main data characterising the 2012-15 elections are represented in Table 1.   7 6 Legislation adopted in November 2013 lowered the minimum percentage of members of regional legislatures that were required to be elected on the basis of proportional representation from 50% to 25% and the requirement to use the PR system was lifted completely for elections to the Moscow City Duma and the St. Petersburg City Council. 7 The level of inter-party competition in elections to regional legislatures was measured with the help of the following indicators: 1. For elections: the number of nominated and registered party lists in each region; the share of votes received by the largest party; the effective number of electoral parties (ENPE)
for each region (in all regions as a whole -a range and an average value). ENPE was calculated by the
-1 where рi is the share of the total number of valid 6
[ Table 1 about here]
Nomination and Registration of Parties
As can be seen in Table 1 , 23 parties had the right to participate in the 2012 regional elections. However, as a result of the reinstatement of the requirement to gather nomination signatures, the average number of registered parties fell to 9.3 in 2014 and 7.7 in 2015 (see Table 1 ).
Voting for United Russia and the Opposition
votes received by a party (Laakso, Taagepera 1979) . However, the Laakso and Taagepera's ENP has some disadvantages, particularly for the measurement of dominant party systems (such as Russia), as their method overemphasises the weight of minor parties. In order to eliminate this problem, we have also calculated the values of ENP using an alternative formula ENPE proposed by Golosov (2010) 
. where x is a total number of parties in the system, Si -the share of votes received by a party, S1 -the share of the party winning first place at the election (see Table 3 ).
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As can be seen in Table 2 , UR won a majority of the party list votes in 33 of the 46 regional elections, and over two thirds of the votes in 16 regions (see Table 2 ). Table 2 ).
[ Table 2 about here]
Levels of Contestation: effective number of electoral parties
The highest ENPE scores according to the Laaskso-Taagepera formula were to be found in Arkhangelsk, Yaroslavl and Smolensk oblasts in 2013 (4.27, 4.27 and 4.22 respectively), whilst the lowest ENPE was found in Kemerovo Oblast (1.31 in 2013). A total of 13 regions had a score of less than 2. According to the Golosov formula there were 28 regions with scores of less than 2. The highest was 3.32 in Arkhangelsk and the lowest, 1.16 in Kemerovo (see Table   3 ). In 2014, despite the sharp increase in the number of parties, ENPE was less than 2, in 6 of the 13 regions (according to the Laakso-Taagepera formula), and less than 2 in 11 regions (according to the Golosov formula). Thus, the sharp rise in the number of registered parties did not raise the level of the inter-party competition. In 2015 the ENPE exceeded 3 only in Kostroma and Novosibirsk oblasts (according to Laakso-Taagepera) whilst in Voronezh and Nenets AO it did not even reach 2 (see Table 3 ). According to the Golosov formula, 9 of the 11 regions had an ENPE of less than two.
[ Table 1 ). As can be seen in Table 4 , UR won a total average of 371 seats (81.3%).
Moreover it won over 90% of the seats in half of the regional assemblies, and more than two thirds in all the other regions (with the exception of North Ossetia). 8 The CPRF was second with a total average of 39 seats (8.5%), JR was third with 24 (4.3%) and the LDPR came last with 20 (5.2%).The 2015 elections led to the formation of non-competitive legislatures with poor representation of the opposition. In these elections UR won a total of 371 of the 456 seats (81.3%). The success rate of the other parliamentary parties was very modest. The CPRF won a total of just 39 seats (8.5%), more than half of them in Novosibirsk oblast. The LDPR won just 20 seats (4.3%) and Just Russia -24 (5.2%), (see Table 4 ).
To sum up, the radical changes to party and electoral legislation in 2012 opened a "window of opportunity" for opposition parties to participate more fully in regional elections but throughout the period UR dominated all of the assemblies. Opposition parties were most successful in gaining entry to the elections in 2013 when the legislation governing the nomination and registration of candidates and party lists was most relaxed, and the level of electoral competition was relatively high. However, as demonstrated above, in 2014 the "window of opportunity" began to close and this trend continued in 2015, leading to a reduction in the number of party lists contesting the elections and a drop in the success rate of the parliamentary opposition parties.
8 Legislation adopted in May 2014 (see footnote 3) reduced the electoral threshold for the party list elections from 7 to 5% thus making it easier for some opposition parties to gain seats in some regional assemblies. 3. Identifying cleavages and changes in the cleavage structure.
Methodology of Research on Cleavages
The cleavage structure, which can be understood as interdependence between the social status of voters and their political preferences, constitutes the foundations of any party system. When
Lipset and Rokkan in their path-breaking study (1967) formulated their cleavage theory, they kept in mind the evident differences in voting for parties with opposing ideologies in various territorial units.
As a rule, Lipset-Rokkan followers have dealt only with the most apparent cleavages dominating in the political space. But the cleavage structure of any society will also contain less visible cleavages. This problem is especially acute for countries with fluid and unstable party systems where every election produces new political actors. In such cases factor analysis comes to the rescue. Slider, Gimpelson and Chugrov (1994) used this method for detecting electoral cleavages 9 in the Russian Duma election of 1993, Zarycki (1999 Zarycki ( , 2002 and Zarycki and Nowak (2000) employed it for parliamentary and presidential elections in Poland. But the conclusions of these studies have been brought into question due to the difficulties they encountered when they tried to work out the political and social explanators for the "electoral cleavages."
It was relatively easy to find the socio-demographic background of electoral cleavages. Slider et al. (1994) , Zarycki (1999 Zarycki ( , 2002 and Zarycki and Nowak (2000) compared factor 9 By the term 'electoral cleavage' we understand the differentiation of electoral preferences empirically fixed at every single election. In order to be recognized as a 'full' cleavage according to Bartolini and Mair's interpretation (1990) , an electoral cleavage must be repeated several times; also, its close links to certain political parties and the political values of significant groups of voters must be demonstrated. However, it is much more difficult to interpret electoral cleavages politically in those countries where the number of contestants is high and volatile. This problem does not exist in the party systems of Western countries which generally have a smaller number of participants.
As a rule, the picture of political contestation here, is clear and understandable. Where the electoral system is fluid and there is a high turnover of parties in each election cycle, it makes more sense to compare the electoral cleavage structure with political cleavages.
The study of 'political cleavages' is well-developed and the use of factor analysis is common practice. (Evans & Whitefield, 1998; Moreno, 1999; Kitschelt et al., 1999; Whitefield, 2002; König, Marbach, and Osnabrügge, 2013; Dalton and McAllister, 2015) . However, a key problem with the existing studies, is the fact that they have to rely on public opinion polls and expert surveys for their data. Such an approach has its drawbacks. As Stoll points out, factor analysis of public or political elite opinion data usually relies 'upon the analyst selecting a relevant set of issues for consideration' (Stoll, 2004, p. 45) . As a result, researches not only study the issues but also help to form the final picture.
Moreover, the political preferences of voters often do not exist in a prepared form. They are created in dialogue between the electorate and political actors during electoral campaigns.
Thus, what political actors express is a product of the joint work of the politicians and the voters. Therefore, if the task is to understand why citizens vote for certain parties, it is necessary 11 to study all of the electoral campaign materials, rather than the opinions of experts, or just party programmes. This method helps us to highlight issues raised by political actors that are of interest to voters and that excite the liveliest discussion among contestants.
The next step is to identify the position of every contestant on every issue using a scale from -5 to +5. The range of issues examined in this study varied from ideological to situational. The main criteria employed in selecting the sample were; (1) the issues were discussed by the most active actors and (2) and oligarchs', but, unlike Ziuganov and other CPRF leaders, he stated this just once, and no one else in the party dared to repeat this again; thus the party's position was assessed as -1.
[ Table 5 about here]
The scores of parties on every issue are then subjected to factor analysis. The factors discovered in this process can be considered as 'political cleavages'. Their factor loadings must be compared with those of electoral cleavages by correlation analysis. If the correlation is significant (R ≥ 0.5) it means that the electoral cleavage has political content. about 5000 documents were examined for the 2015 regional campaigns.
Variations in the structure of political cleavages
What political cleavages are present in post-communist Russia? For all Duma elections from 1993 to 2011 there were just three such cleavages, regardless of the number of participants: (1) socio-economic, (2) authoritarian-democratic and (3) systemic (Korgunyuk, 2014) . The first, which is also known as the left-right cleavage, is familiar to all scholars who study cleavages.
The authoritarian-democratic cleavage is no longer applicable to Western democracies, but this is not the case for some of the post-communist countries of Central and Easter Europe, and some countries in Latin America (Moreno, 1999; Torcal & Mainwaring, 2002; Stoll, 2004, p. 44).
The third cleavage, the systemic political cleavage, appears, as a rule, only in those countries undergoing transition. In the 1990s, such a dimension existed in the political space of post-communist polities of Eastern and Central Europe (it reflected the attitude of citizens to the political and economic reforms) and in some countries of Latin America -the so-called 14 liberal-fundamentalist dimension (Kitschelt, 1995; Moreno, 1999; Stoll, 2004, p. 44; Clemente, 2009) . In Russia, the systemic political cleavage comprises issues from the socioeconomic and authoritarian-democratic agendas and it is considered to be a sound indicator of the general direction of the country's political development.
This threefold structure of political cleavages looks quite "archaic" from a western perspective. The authoritarian-democratic cleavage lost its salience in Western Europe after World War II, and for Eastern and Central Europe -at the beginning of the 2000s. As for the systemic cleavage, it is specific, as a rule, for transitioning societies and its presence indicates a high level of political polarization -the main actors do not gravitate towards the centre but repel each other, and by this method they "stretch" the political space.
Changes in the balance of power between opposite political forces can make the system quite In 2015, the factor analysis of the issue positions of seven parties (UR, LDPR, CPRF, JR, Yabloko, PR, RPR-PARNAS) revealed only two political cleavages. The first was "imperialistic" (systemic). The greatest confrontation was generated by the "Ukrainian" issues but there were also debates over abolishing the so-called "state corporations" and repealing the law on "NGOs-Foreign Agents": the liberal leading parties, Yabloko and PARNAS parties were pro, all the others -contra (Table 6 ). Thus, the systemic cleavage went beyond the foreign policy agenda and included domestic-political and socio-economic agendas. As for the second political cleavage, it can be interpreted as "authority vs opposition". The political issues
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("Attitudes to municipal reforms", "Cancelling the municipal filter in gubernatorial elections")
were mixed up with socioeconomic factors ("The government's anti-crisis plan is ineffective", "Real social budget expenditures are being reduced"), (Table 7) .
[ Tables 6 and 7 about here]
In addition to the seven parties noted above, there were 8 additional parties which received more than 1% of the votes in the PR system in September 13, 2015. If we add these parties to our analysis, a third political cleavage can be detected which may be characterized as socioeconomic, or, more precisely, as a hybrid of the socioeconomic and the authoritarian- Overall, we can state that over the period 2012-15 the structure of political cleavages moved out of balance, and this imbalance grew especially fast in 2014-15. Over the period 1995-2011, the hierarchy of political cleavages remained stable: the socioeconomic cleavage held first place, the systemic one -came second, the authoritarian-democratic -third. In 2012, the relatively "archaic" authoritarian-democratic cleavage pushed the socioeconomic cleavage into second place. Then, in 2014, the "Ukrainian" cleavage (systemic in its essence) came to 17 the fore -its emergence was a consequence of the acute polarization which emerged around the Crimea-Ukrainian issues, where there was no middle position -only full support for Putin or strong condemnation Putin and his policies.
Finally, in 2015 the number of political cleavages was reduced to two. But these were not the cleavages found in advanced industrial countries (economic left-right and materialismpost-materialism -see Moreno, 1999) . The first, "Ukrainian", cleavage was of a systemic nature, whilst the second had an authoritarian-democratic character and absorbed completely the socioeconomic cleavage. This structure of political cleavages can be considered highly abnormal, and peculiar to crisis situations.
The number and types of political cleavages in the regions
In 2012 In 2012-13, the primary political cleavage was authoritarian-democratic in all regions.
More precisely, not so much authoritarian-democratic as 'authority vs opposition'.
Authoritarian-democratic issues ("attitudes to the party reforms", "cancelling the municipal filter in the gubernatorial elections") were mixed with socioeconomic ("freezing of housing 18 and utility tariffs", "return to a progressive income tax"). In 2013 some issues from the systemic "kit" were wedged into this cleavage: "the right of citizens to carry handguns", "constitutional recognition of the state-forming status of ethnic Russians".
As for the second political cleavage, in 2012 it had socioeconomic features in four regions and in two it owed its existence to "spoiler" parties (more precisely, to "zeros" in their positions). Features of socioeconomic cleavage were also detected in the fourth political cleavage in four regions. The third electoral cleavage in all six regions, with the exception of Sakhalin, was mostly systemic (Table 8 ).
[ Table 8 about here]
In 2013, the second political cleavage had a predominantly systemic nature in all 16
regions but with the domination of the authoritarian-democratic features in three oblasts, and socioeconomic in the rest of regions. Thus, the Russian authorities have mastered the art of manipulation with a number of political cleavages in every single region. Depending on the aims pursued, they can either increase this number (if the aim was to confuse the voter) or diminish it (if the aim was to limit choice). In 2012-13, the aim was more often to disorientate the voter, and the appearance of many new parties made it impossible to comprehend the picture, not only for ordinary voters, but also for political scientists armed with statistical tools.
In 2014-15, the goal was, on the contrary, to limit the choice of the voter. "inconvenient"
parties were not allowed to participate in the elections. Thus, we find that the cleavage structure in all regions acquired a minimalist character.
Variations in the structure of electoral cleavages
The 2012 elections
The first effects of the party reform were felt already in the 2012 elections. The number of electoral cleavages with eigenvalue ≥1 increased in comparison to the Duma election of 2011 in 3 of 6 regions: from 2 to 3 in Saratov and Sakhalin oblasts and from 3 to 5 in North Ossetia 11 (see Table 9 ). The reason for this were the growing number of political cleavages (which rose from 3 to 4 in all regions except Penza oblast) and the reduced administrative pressure on voters, evidenced by a drop in turnout (by 22 per cent on average).
11 It is important to recall that factor analysis detected in the 2011 Duma Election a single electoral cleavage in 4 regions, 2 cleavages in 52 regions, 3 in 26, and 4 in just one -Yekaterinburg oblast (see Korgunyuk, 2015) .
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[ Table 9 about here]
In all 6 regions with the exception of North Ossetia, the primary electoral cleavage was strongly correlated with the authoritarian-democratic political cleavage. It was a typical "authority against community" cleavage which has been dominant in In the 2014 elections, the first effects of the "party counter-reforms" were felt. The number of electoral cleavages in 13 regions 14 varied from one (Tatarstan) to five (Republic of Altai) ( Table 9 ).
The first electoral cleavage had a strong correlation with the authoritarian-democratic political cleavage everywhere with the exception of the Republic of Altai (politics in this region are determined mainly by patrimonial clan rivalries), Crimea and Sevastopol. In Tatarstan 14 Moscow has to be excluded from the analysis because the election to the City Duma was held exclusively in single-member districts.
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The 2015 elections
In 2015, the tendency to reduce the number of electoral cleavages continued. This time the highest number of electoral cleavages was three-which was the case in 4 regions. There were only two electoral cleavages in 6 regions, and just one -in Voronezh oblast. As before, the first electoral cleavage had a strong correlation with the authoritarian-democratic political cleavage in all the regions; in four regions it was combined with the "Ukrainian" political divide. Because of the absorption of the socioeconomic political cleavage by the authoritariandemocratic cleavage (termed, "authority-oppositional"), we can find its traces in not a single electoral cleavage. So, the second and third electoral cleavages were deprived of any political content almost everywhere.
The connection between electoral cleavages and stratification factors also declined. The In summary, we can observe a significant simplification of the cleavage structure and a decline in the level of political competition in the 2015 elections. In comparison to the 2011 Duma election, a widening of political competition can only be found in Kaluga oblast -which was most likely connected to the wider number of contestants.
Conclusion
The party reform of 2012 stimulated the emergence of new political parties and the reactivation of the current ones. But increasing electoral competition did not shake the domination of United Russia in the regional legislatures. Moreover, the space of inter-party competition narrowed significantly in some places. In addition, the emergence of new parties 24 led to the ousting of the parliamentary opposition and independent deputies from a number of legislatures.
Nevertheless, over the period 2012-13 the growth of inter-party competition, coupled with a slight increase in party fragmentation, led to an augmentation of the political space and a rise in the number of electoral cleavages. Moreover, the hierarchy of political cleavages changed markedly in comparison to the 2011 Duma election: the authoritarian-democratic cleavage (the third in 1995-2011) came first, the socioeconomic one (the first earlier) became the second, the systemic (the second) -was third. It was a first sign of the unbalancing of the political cleavage structure, if we assume that the primary place of the socioeconomic cleavage is a key determinant of its equilibrium.
Lower voting for United Russia combined with the growing activity of the opposition, were interpreted by the Kremlin as a threat to political stability. Thus, we witnessed the party counter-reforms of 2013-14 which reduced the opportunities of opposition candidates, even those from the loyal parliamentary opposition.
The number of parties represented in the regional legislatures fell in 2014-15 to almost pre-reform levels, and the presence of the opposition became symbolic in many assemblies.
The authorities succeeded in strengthening the position of United Russia by fragmenting the opposition. The existing party system was conserved by creating spoiler projects which were designed to imitate genuine inter-party competition.
The trend towards an ever greater tightening up of entry requirements for contestation in the elections led to a lowering of the number of political and, consequently, electoral cleavages, in addition to a reformatting of the political space. The "Ukrainian" political cleavage came to the fore, whilst the socioeconomic and authoritarian cleavages merged into one. This trend was especially evident in 2015 when the third political cleavage was not found Moreover, the number of regions increased where electoral cleavages had no connection to the levels of social stratification. All these trends indicate a growing divergence between the political and electoral spaces. This can be explained by a certain inertia of the voters, but also by an imbalance of the political system which may be interpreted as a sign of an impending political crisis. 
